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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
______________________________  
      : 
DENNIS OBADO,    : 
      : 
  Plaintiff,   :  Civil No. 13-2382 (JAP) 
      : 
 v.     :  OPINION 
      : 
ED MAGEDSON, et al.,   :  
      : 
  Defendants.   : 
                                                             : 
PISANO, District Judge. 
 Pro se Plaintiff, Dennis Obado, has filed a ninety-three page, seventeen count Second 
Amended Complaint against nearly twenty defendants.  Plaintiff has successfully served eight 
defendants, all of which have now moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.  Plaintiff 
opposes all these motions.  The Court decides these motions without oral argument pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.  For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants these 
motions. 
I. Background 
 On April 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a fifty-four page Complaint against fifteen defendants.  
By May 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed his ninety-three page Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), 
which included approximately seventeen counts against nearly twenty defendants.  Plaintiff 
ultimately served eight of the named Defendants:  (1) Intelius Inc., (2) Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 
(3) Switchboard LLC & Whitepages, Inc., (4) Enom.com, (5) Softlayer Technologies, Inc., (6) 
Neustar, Inc., (7) Yahoo! Inc., and (8) Google Inc. (together, the “Defendants”). 
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 This entire lawsuit stems from certain alleged blog postings made by two individuals.  
The first posting was made on October 9, 2012 by an anonymous blogger with the alias “Mama 
Duka,” who made certain defamatory comments concerning Plaintiff on the website 
www.ripoffreport.com.  The second posting was made by an individual named Diop Kamau 
(a.k.a. “Don Jackson”) who made a number of postings that are allegedly defamatory and of a 
private nature regarding Plaintiff on various websites, including www.policeabuse.com, 
maryhoerster.blogspot.com, www.ripoffreport.com, www.scribd.com, www.yousendit.com. 
Plaintiff has brought suit against the Defendants because they displayed, distributed or linked to 
these third-party commentary and images.  See SAC ¶¶ 3, 14, 62, 82–83, 94.  Plaintiff also 
alleges that Defendants engaged in “editing functions” and “publishing functions” by including 
links to the posts at issue in search results, sorting these results in a “disparate, and 
discriminatory manner,” and by not removing those results upon notice and demand.  See id. at 
¶¶ 22, 31, 34, 47–48, 52, 62, 82–83, 92, 99, 110–16, 144, 147.  Plaintiff also asserts that the 
Defendants displayed allegedly “defamatory search terms” such as “Dennis Obado and criminal” 
and “Dennis Obado’s workers compensation case” through search results or “post[ed] 
defamatory images” with Plaintiff’s name.  SAC ¶¶ 23, 29, 47, 61, 68, 83.  Plaintiff also alleges 
that Defendants have refused to remove and/or investigate the materials in violation of their 
“terms of use policy, confidentiality agreement, privacy policies, and opt out policies.”  See SAC 
¶¶ 45, 53. 55, 57.  Plaintiff seeks $500 million in damages, plus injunctive relief.  There is no 
allegation that any of the Defendants actually authored any of the posts, third-party websites, or 
images at issue in this case. 
 As mentioned, the SAC consists of seventeen counts.  These seventeen counts include 
claims for the following:  defamation, slander per se and per quod, and libel per se and per quod; 
2 
 
Case 3:13-cv-02382-JAP-TJB   Document 229   Filed 07/31/14   Page 2 of 17 PageID: 2449
intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; a violation 
of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”); punitive damages; improper publication of 
private facts; invasion of privacy; intrusion upon seclusion; false light; a violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); unfair and deceptive practices under state law; 
common law fraud; a second defamation claim in which Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 
conspired with each other; falsity; “damage to reputation, and damage to emotional and mental 
health”; and “fault-negligence and actual malice.”  All the claims are brought against all 
Defendants, except for four counts:  improper publication of private facts (Count Six), invasion 
of privacy (Count Seven), intrusion upon seclusion (Count Eight), and reverse discrimination 
under the ADEA (Count Nine).  Those four counts are brought against defendants Intelius, Diop 
Kamau (who has not been served), and/or the individual bloggers. 
 Each Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss.  Due to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the 
briefing schedule has been extended, allowing Plaintiff extra time to respond to each motion.  
Accordingly, the first motion to dismiss was filed in December 2013, and the final reply brief 
was filed on May 23, 2014.  To put it mildly, Plaintiff has been an active litigant, filing 
numerous entries on the docket in support of his SAC.  On March 3, 2014, the Court entered an 
Order, advising Plaintiff that any amendment submitted after the opposition due date would be 
disregarded.  See ECF No. 158.  Plaintiff continued to file such “amended” oppositions, 
however.1  The Court has reviewed these oppositions in consideration of Plaintiff’s pro se status, 
and has considered them to the degree necessary.  While some Defendants have raised 
additional, nuanced arguments regarding why the SAC should be dismissed, each motion is 
1 Plaintiff has also filed certain briefs that he has titled “cross-motions for summary judgment.”  To the extent that 
these briefs could be considered “cross-motions,” the Court need not address their applicability because Defendants 
are immune from Plaintiff’s claims.   
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premised on Defendants’ claim that they are immune from suit under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.   
II. Standard of Review  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint 
“for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  When reviewing a motion to 
dismiss, courts must first separate the factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of 
the well-pleaded facts as true.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 
2009).  All reasonable inferences must be made in the Plaintiff’s favor.  See In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).   
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007).  This standard requires the plaintiff to show “more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  A “plaintiff's 
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  When assessing the 
sufficiency of a civil complaint, a court must distinguish factual contentions and “[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678.  Any legal conclusions are “not entitled to the assumption of truth” by a 
reviewing court.  Id. at 679.  Rather, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a 
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”  Id.  See also Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 
(explaining that “a complaint must do more than allege a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief”).  
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Generally, the Court’s task in assessing a motion to dismiss requires it to disregard any 
material beyond the pleadings.   See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1426 (3d Cir. 1997).  A district court may, however, consider the factual allegations within other 
documents, including those described or identified in the Complaint and matters of public record, 
if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon those documents.  See id. at 1426; Mayer v. Belichick, 
605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the court may properly consider the 
“complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as indisputably 
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents”).   
III. Discussion 
 A. Background of the CDA 
 The question facing this Court is whether Defendants have been granted statutory 
immunity against Plaintiff’s claims.  Section 230 of the CDA states, in relevant part:  “No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  
Section 230 also provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  Id. § 230(e)(3).   
 Therefore, the “plain language” of § 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of 
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service.”  Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997), cert 
denied, 538 524 U.S. 937 (1998); see also Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470–71 (3d Cir. 
2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).  
Section 230 “overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers under 
statutory and common law,” due to Congress’s decision “‘not to treat providers of interactive 
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computer services like other information providers such as newspapers, magazines or television 
and radio stations, all of which may be held liable for publishing or distributing obscene or 
defamatory material written or prepared by others.’”  Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C.1998)).  In other words, 
“§ 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in 
a publisher's role,” and “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
postpone, or alter content-are barred.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also Green, 318 F.3d at 471.  
Under the statute, there are certain causes of action that are specifically not barred by § 230; 
namely, cases of action based on (1) federal criminal statutes, (2) intellectual property law, (3) 
state law “that is consistent with this section,” and (4) the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986.  47 U.S.C § 230 (e)(1)-(4).   
 “Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a 
minimum.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.  Congress stressed in specific statutory findings that “[t]he 
Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.”  42 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).  Congress, therefore, recognized the threat that tort-liability 
would pose to freedom of speech in the Internet, and wanted to immunize service providers for 
the communications of otherwise in order to avoid government regulation of speech:  “It is the 
policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” Id. § 230(b)(2).   As the Fourth Circuit noted as early as 1997:   
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The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an 
obvious chilling effect.  It would be impossible for service providers to screen 
each of their millions of postings for possible problems.  Faced with potential 
liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer 
service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of 
messages posted.  Congress considered the weight of the speech interests 
implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive 
effect. 
 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.  
 B. Defendants Qualify for Immunity under the CDA 
 In order to qualify for immunity under § 230, three elements must be met:  (1) the 
defendant must be a provider or user of an “interactive computer service,” (2) “the asserted 
claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information,” and (3) “the challenged 
communication must be information provided by another information content provider.”  Dimeo 
v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 248 F. App'x 280 (3d Cir. 2007).  Once 
CDA immunity applies, providers are immune from “any” claim arising out of content 
originating from a third party, regardless of the theory underlying the cause of action.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(e)(3); see also Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hat 
matters is not the name of the cause of action—defamation versus negligence versus intentional 
infliction of emotional distress—what matters is whether the cause of action inherently requires 
the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.”). 
 Here, there is no dispute that Defendants are all providers of an “interactive computer 
service,” as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f).2  Likewise, there is no dispute that the posts constitute 
“information provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1).  An 
information content provider “means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, 
2 Under § 230(f)(2), an “‘interactive computer service’ means any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a 
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for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.” Id. § 230(f)(3).  Plaintiff’s SAC makes clear that the allegedly 
defamatory posts were created by and authored entirely by an anonymous blogger named “Mama 
Duka” and an individual named Diop Kamau.   
 Likewise, in regards to the second element, it is clear that each of Plaintiff’s seventeen 
claims “treat” Defendants as the “publisher” and not the creator of the alleged defamatory 
content.   Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “published” and “distributed” the allegedly 
defamatory blogs posted on www.ripoffreport.com and other sites through “internet search 
results.”  It is not alleged (nor could it be) that any Defendants created this content.  Plaintiff is 
simply seeking to hold the various Defendants liable for “publishing” such content in its search 
engine results or otherwise providing access to such results.  In each instance raised by Plaintiff’s 
tort or federal claims, Defendants either archived or simply provided access to content that was 
created by third parties.  The allegedly defamatory statements were created by “Mama Duka” 
and Diop Kamau.  Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants in any way participated in the 
creation of the content of the blogs, or altered the content of the blogs in any way.   Clearly, § 
230 provides immunity for service providers like Defendants on exactly the claims that Plaintiff 
alleges here.  See Green, 318 F.3d at 471 (holding § 230 barred tort action against AOL for its 
allegedly negligent failure to remove defamatory material from a chat room on its network); Doe 
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding plaintiff’s claims, allegedly based 
on MySpace’s failure to implement appropriate safety measures, are “merely another way of 
claiming MySpace was liable for publishing the communications” of third-parties and are 
consequently barred by the CDA); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500–01 (E.D. Pa. 
2006) (explaining Google is immune under the CDA for tort claims premised on allowing access 
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to allegedly defamatory messages posted by third-party users on Usenet’s message boards); 
Dimeo, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 530–31 (holding CDA immunity applied for defamation claim against 
an owner of a website that hosts online message board where a third-party user posted allegedly 
defamatory statements); Milgrim v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 305, 316 (2010) 
(finding defendants immune from liability under the CFA for conduct of third-party sellers using 
defendants’ websites).   
 In an attempt to avoid CDA immunity, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have engaged in 
certain “editing functions” by posting “Mama Duke’s false defamatory blog, in a way that the 
public would construe this blog as fact, by not including in the same result, Plaintiff’s rebuttal in 
a conspicuous manner, in the same first page of [the search results]” and by “controlling which 
defamatory blog wording would be posted on internet search engines.”  See SAC ¶¶ 22, 31, 48, 
83, 92.  These claims fail to create liability for the Defendants.  The Third Circuit has held the 
CDA immunizes traditional publisher conduct, such as “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, 
or alter content.”  Green, 318 F.3d at 471.  In the context of an internet service provider, “such 
decisions would include deciding whether to provide access to third-party content or whether to 
delete the content from its archival or cache.”  Mmubango v. Google, Inc., CIV. A. 12-1300, 
2013 WL 664231, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013) (citing Green, 318 F.3d at 471).  Thus, any 
claims premised on any posting or alleged manipulation of search results to favor the alleged 
defamatory content about Plaintiff are not actionable under § 230.   Further, even assuming that 
Defendants did selectively choose how to display certain search results, these types of editorial 
functions are still protected by § 230.  See Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, CV 10-
01360, 2011 WL 2469822, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (finding that alleged manipulation of 
HMTL code to make certain third-party reviews “highly visible and influential in Google search 
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results” did not render the defendants “information content providers” because “[i]ncreasing the 
visibility of a statement is not tantamount to altering its message”).  In reality, the results of a 
search engine query are determined by an underlying algorithm.  None of the relevant 
Defendants used any sort of unlawful criteria to limit the scope of searches conducted on them; 
“[t]herefore, such search engines play no part in the ‘development’ of the unlawful searches” and 
are acting purely as an interactive computer service.  Fair Housing Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommtes.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008).  Accordingly, Defendants 
are entitled to immunity under the CDA.      
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants have failed to remove the alleged defamatory blogs 
in violation of each Defendant’s terms of use and privacy policies.  See SAC ¶¶ 29, 55.   
However, § 230 immunity extends to the service provider’s decisions about how to treat 
potentially objectionable material.  As the Third Circuit has explained, § 230 “specifically 
proscribes liability” in situations where an interactive service provider makes a decisions 
“relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from its network—actions 
quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.”  Green, at 470–71.  Defendants cannot be held 
liable for failing to withdraw any of the alleged defamatory statements, just as they cannot be 
found liable for “deciding” to publish any such statements through its search results.  See 
Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Deciding whether or not to 
remove content or deciding when to remove content falls squarely within Ask.com’s exercise of 
a publisher’s traditional rule and is therefore subject to the CDA’s broad immunity.”).   
 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants displayed through search results certain “defamatory 
search terms” like “Dennis Obado and criminal” or posted allegedly defamatory images with 
Plaintiff’s name.  See SAC ¶¶ 23, 29, 47, 61, 68, 83.  As Plaintiff himself has alleged, these 
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images at issue originate from third-party websites on the Internet which are captured by an 
algorithm used by the search engine, which uses neutral and objective criteria.  Significantly, this 
means that the images and links displaced in the search results simply point to content generated 
by third parties.  See, e.g., Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2009) 
aff'd, 623 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that search results are not created by the search 
engine itself; rather the search engine “only displays the content in response to a C-user’s search 
results” and therefore does not create the content); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 
F. Supp. 2d 700, 701–02 (E.D. Va. 2004) (explaining how search engines work).  Thus, 
Plaintiff’s allegations that certain search terms or images appear in response to a user-generated 
search for “Dennis Obado” into a search engine fails to establish any sort of liability for 
Defendants.  These results are simply derived from third-party websites, based on information 
provided by an “information content provider.”  The linking, displaying, or posting of this 
material by Defendants falls within CDA immunity.  See Stayart, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 885 
(explaining that Yahoo! search results for plaintiff’s name were not created by Yahoo! itself but 
by another information content provider); Murawski, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (holding that 
Ask.com could not be held liable for information that appears as a result of a search query for the 
plaintiff’s name); Parker, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (finding that Google is not an “information 
content provider” because “the information on websites that appears as a result of a search 
query” are created by “other internet users”).   
Likewise, suggested search terms auto-generated by a search engine do not remove that 
search engine from the CDA’s broad protection because such auto-generated terms “indicates 
only that other websites and users have connected plaintiff’s name” with certain terms.  Stayart 
v. Google Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1056–57 (E.D. Wis. 2011) aff'd, 710 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 
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2013) (finding that plaintiff’s allegation that Google suggested the phrase “bev stayart levitra”—
the plaintiff’s name and the name of a sexual dysfunction drug—when plaintiff Googled her 
name did not allow plaintiff to “get around [the CDA] obstacle”).  This is true even if, as 
Plaintiff argues, Defendants acted in bad faith.  See Levitt v. Yelp!, Inc., No. C-10-1321, 2011 
WL 5079526, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (holding that CDA immunity applied “regardless 
of whether the publisher acts in good faith”).   
C. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Qualify for any Exceptions to the CDA 
 Finally, in a last-ditch attempt to avoid his claims being barred by Section 230, Plaintiff 
has offered up a scattering of reasons in his Oppositions for why his claims should not be barred 
under certain exceptions to the CDA.  Plaintiff first argues that the First Amendment precludes 
immunity under the CDA.   Next, Plaintiff also asserts “new” claims for a right of publicity 
violation, criminal conspiracy, and promissory estoppel, apparently in an effort to avail himself 
of certain limited exceptions to the CDA’s otherwise broad immunity. 3  Even if the Court were 
to consider Plaintiff’s new allegations, which do not exist within the SAC,4 they still fail to 
circumvent § 230 immunity.   
First, Plaintiff argues that a “1st Amendment exception” for “fighting words” and “hate 
speech” bars immunity under the CDA.  In other words, Plaintiff appears to be arguing that, 
3 Plaintiff has also cited in his Oppositions that Plaintiffs have violated the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”), 17 
U.S.C. § 160A, but has failed to allege any facts to show that Yahoo violated a “work of visual art.”  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101.  The only “work” discussed, however, is Plaintiff’s purported manuscript, which does not qualify as a “work 
of visual art” under VARA.  Furthermore, Plaintiff only alleges that Yahoo “distributed criminal blogs,” not any part 
of Plaintiff’s manuscript.  Plaintiff also argues that Defendants have violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding 
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, but has failed to show how any Defendants have obstructed a federal investigation.  
Finally, Plaintiff argues in passing that Defendants have violated numerous other federal criminal statutes aimed at 
protecting civil rights.  Even assuming Plaintiff could bring a claim under such criminal statutes, Plaintiff has failed 
to allege how Defendants have violated his civil rights, 18 U.S.C § 241, or interfered with plaintiff’s exercise of a 
federal protected activity or committed a hate crime against him, 18 U.S.C. § 245.  Even the quickest review of the 
SAC shows that Plaintiff’s claims are premised on defamation, not any sort of civil rights or federal criminal 
violation.   
4 See Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir.1988) (“It is axiomatic that the 
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). 
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insofar as the allegedly defamatory blog posts are outside the First Amendment, Defendants 
cannot be protected by the CDA for providing access or otherwise linking to that material.  This 
argument is unavailing.  The CDA is meant to shield interactive computer service providers from 
liability for unprotected otherwise actionable speech originating from other information content 
providers.  Congress intended to eliminate any possible “chilling effect” that could be caused by 
“the threat [of] tort-based lawsuits against interactive services for injury caused by the 
communications of others.”  Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, regardless of whether the third-party speech itself is unlawful, CDA 
immunity applies.  See, e,g., Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (“It is, by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information 
provided is not enough to make it the service provider's own speech.”).    
 Plaintiff’s argument regarding his right to publicity or any other intellectual-property 
claim appears to be an attempt to rely on the CDA’s intellectual-property exception.  Plaintiff 
asserts that Defendants infringed on his right to publicity and privacy by using his likeness to 
generate profits for their companies because he is an author.  He argues that CDA immunity does 
not apply where a corporation publicizes an author in a negative way to create business for that 
corporation.  Even if this Court were to assume that the CDA’s intellectual exception applies to 
state law claims like the ones Plaintiff invokes,5 Plaintiff’s argument fails as a matter of law.  
Plaintiff’s theory seems to be based on references to Mr. Obado that appear as part of the 
standard search results of the various search engine Defendants.  The mere appearance of 
Plaintiff’s name or image as part of the search results displayed in response to a user-generated 
query does not mean that the relevant company used Plaintiff’ name for advertising or trade 
5 The Ninth Circuit, for example, has expressly held that the intellectual-property exception applies only to federal 
intellectual property claims, not to state law claims.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–11120 
1120 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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purposes.  There is, in fact, no grounds for any plausible inference that any of the Defendants 
used Plaintiff’s name for advertising or trade purposes such as would be necessary to state a 
claim for right to publicity.  See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994) (“In 
New Jersey, to sustain an action claiming misappropriation of the image of another, a 
commercial purpose must be present.”); Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904, 909–
10 (D.N.J. 1986) (“[T]he use must be mainly for purposes of trade, without a redeeming public 
interest, news, or historical value.”).  Mere mention of a plaintiff’s name is not enough to show 
appropriation; “nor is the value of his likeness appropriated when it is published for purposes 
other than taking advantage of his reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for 
purposes of publicity.”  Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 452 A.2d 689, 6923 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).  Here, the conduct that Plaintiff alleges infringed on his right to 
publicity is nothing more than the ordinary “dissemination of news or information” that cannot 
give right to a right of publicity claim.  Tellado, 643 F. Supp. at 909–10.  “Plaintiff's allegations 
establish no more than that [Defendants] enable[] internet users to access publically available 
materials connected to plaintiff's name. And it is not unlawful to use a person's name ‘primarily 
for the purpose of communicating information . . . .” Stayart, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (quoting 
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574 (1977)).  To find otherwise 
would allow any Internet search engine to face a claim from anyone whose name or image 
appears on the Internet in a way that person does not like.   This is exactly what § 230 immunity 
tried to prevent.   
Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel argument also fails.  While not an exception to the CDA, 
certain courts have allowed promissory estoppel claims to go forward if there was an enforceable 
promise made to the injured party.  For example, in Barnes, the Director of Communications of 
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Yahoo personally called the plaintiff and promised to “personally” make sure that the content at 
issue was removed from Yahoo’s website.  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098–99.  Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit allowed a promissory estoppel claim to proceed because an enforceable promise 
was made to plaintiff.  See id. at 1107.  This is inapposite here, where Plaintiff has not alleged 
that any such legally enforceable promise was made to remove any content by the Defendants.  
While Plaintiff has argued in his Opposition that Defendants emailed Plaintiff indicating that 
they would investigate Plaintiff’s complaints, this fails to establish an enforceable promise to 
actually remove the content.  Instead, Plaintiff seeks to impose “[l]iability upon notice,” which 
“would defeat the . . . purposes advanced by § 230 of the CDA.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th 
Cir. 1997); see also Mmubango, 2013 WL 664231, at *1, 3 (rejecting claim that Google was 
required to remove links to third-party derogatory statements about the plaintiff after receiving 
notice); Gavra v. Google Inc., 5:12-CV-06547-PSG, 2013 WL 3788241, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 
17, 2013) (explaining that liability is not created under § 230 by “refraining from removing 
objectionable content, despite receiving notice”).  As explained in detail above, any alleged 
refusal to remove certain content from search results by the Defendants is nothing more than an 
“exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions,” and is preempted by the CDA.  Green, 
318 F.3d at 471. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants engaged in criminal conspiracy to violate his 
rights.  Even if Plaintiff had alleged any facts to sustain this claim, the CDA exception for 
federal criminal statutes applies to government prosecutions, not to civil private rights of action 
under states with criminal aspects.  See M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 
809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1054–56 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (rejecting argument that CDA immunity did not 
apply to civil remedy provisions for personal injuries under 18 U.S.C. § 2255); Doe v. Bates, 
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5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *4–5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (“Congress 
decided not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based on their own beliefs that a 
service provider's actions violated the criminal laws .”).   Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 
establish that immunity under the CDA does not apply. 
In sum, the CDA effectively works to immunize parties like the Defendants from claims 
that they displayed information from third parties that may depict a party in an unfavorable light.   
“[S]o long as a third party willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive 
service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.”  
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Seldon v. 
Magedson, 11 CIV. 6218, 2012 WL 4475274, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2012) (“Thus, under 
section 230 internet service providers are shielded from liability arising from defamation and 
other state-law claims that are premised on posts of, or links to, third-party content.”).  This case, 
quite simply, attempts to hold Defendants accountable for the publication of allegedly 
defamatory blog postings by third-parties.  Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to immunity 
from all of Plaintiff’s claims—state and federal6—under § 230 of the CDA.    
III. Conclusion  
 Plaintiff has attempted to phrase his allegations and arguments in a way to avoid the 
reach of § 230.  These allegations, however, do not distinguish the complained-of actions of 
Defendants from any other website that has published content that led to an innocent person’s 
injury.  Congress has made the policy decision to hold such websites immune from suits arising 
6 A defendant is likewise immune from liability for a claim under federal law that attempts to place a service 
provider in a publisher’s role.  See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that Section 230 preempts a claim under the Fair Housing Act); 
Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538–39 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d sub nom., Noah v. AOL-Time 
Warner, Inc., 03-1770, 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004).  Here, Plaintiff’s claim under the ADEA clearly 
attempts to hold Defendant Intelius liable for its failure to exercise “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—
such as whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content,” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, and is therefore barred 
under Section 230.  See SAC ¶ 50. 
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from these injures.  Try as Plaintiff may, this is a defamation suit at its core—not a copyright suit 
or civil rights case.  It should be noted, however, that Plaintiff is not entirely without recourse.  
He may bring suit against the actual bloggers who wrote these defamatory posts.  His claims 
against Defendants, however, must be dismissed.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss 
the SAC are granted.  Because any amendment to the SAC would be futile, dismissal will be 
with prejudice.  See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).  An appropriate Order 
accompanies this Opinion. 
 
       /s/ Joel A. Pisano    
       JOEL A. PISANO, U.S.D.J. 
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